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Abstract
Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015, SRH hereafter) demonstrated that shapes of utility and
probability weighting functions could be manipulated by adjusting the distributions of
outcomes and probabilities on offer, as predicted by the theory of Decision by Sampling. So
marked were these effects that, at face value, they profoundly challenge standard
interpretations of preference theoretic models where such functions are supposed to reflect
stable properties of individual risk preferences. Motivated by this challenge, we report an
extensive replication exercise based on a series of experiments conducted as a quasi-
adversarial collaboration across different labs and involving researchers from both economics
and psychology. We replicate the SRH effect across multiple experiments involving changes
in many design features; importantly, however, we find that the effect is also present in
designs modified so that Decision by Sampling predicts no effect. While those results depend
on model-based inferences, an alternative analysis using a model free comparison approach
finds no evidence of patterns akin to the SRH effect. On the basis of simulation exercises, we
demonstrate that the SRH effect may be a consequence of misspecification biases arising in
parameter recovery exercises that fit imperfectly specified choice models to experimental
data. Overall, our analysis casts the SRH effect in an entirely new light.
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2Introduction
In a recent paper published in this journal, Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015)
presented evidence from a series of experiments putatively demonstrating that the utility and
probability weighting functions revealed by fitting standard economic models to binary
choice data were highly sensitive to changes in the distributions of payoffs and probabilities
in the choice sets. While the existence of some such sensitivity may be no surprise (e.g.,
Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010, 2011), the extent
of malleability identified by SRH is considerable. For example, for some distributions of
probabilities and payoffs, SRH were able to produce concave utility functions and inverse-S
shaped probability weighting functions as commonly reported elsewhere in the literature; yet,
for other distributions they generated mirror image patterns (i.e., convex utility and S-shaped
probability weighting functions). For convenience, we will refer to the apparent malleability
of the utility and probability weighting functions identified by SRH as the SRH effect.
At face value, the SRH effect provides important new support for the model of
Decision by Sampling because - as we explain in Section II – predictions of this model
(which we refer to as DbS for short) prompted its discovery. More broadly, however, the
SRH effect sets a potentially severe challenge to a wide range of models of risky decision
making in the preference-theoretic tradition which interpret utility and weighting functions as
embodying an individual’s risk preference. If a researcher can, as SRH explicitly suggest,
choose the shapes of the functions they wish to reveal by adjusting the set of gambles used to
elicit them, then the interpretation that such procedures reveal underlying preferences is
undermined. Hence, the SRH effect provides seemingly powerful new ammunition for those
critical of the adequacy of preference-based models of risky-choice (Friedman et al. 2014;
Gigerenzer, 2016) and support to those who favour process based models, and in particular,
the model of Decision by Sampling (Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al. 2006).
But before interpreting the SRH effect as a strong challenge to preference based
models (or support for procedural models including DbS), it is appropriate to question
whether the effect is replicable and robust. That question is pertinent, not least, in the light of
contemporary controversy surrounding the replicability of many of the findings in the
behavioural sciences and elsewhere (e.g., Camerer et al. 2016; Maniadis et al. 2014; Open
Science Collaboration, 2015). Given this background controversy and the challenging nature
of the SRH findings, we believe that good scientific practice demands careful scrutiny of the
SRH effect, via attempts at replication, to properly assess its significance. With this
motivation in mind, we report an extensive set of replication experiments investigating two
key issues: First, we examine whether the SRH effect is replicable and robust to variations in
experimental design. Pre-empting our results, we conclude that the SRH effect is replicable,
and robust to many small variations in experimental design. The second key issue concerns
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the SRH effect. First, we are able to reproduce the SRH effect in designs which turn off the
mechanism that, according to DbS, generates it; Second, choice based tests find no evidence
of the effects predicted by DbS; Third, by exploring parameter recovery in simulations of a
stochastic expected utility model, we find evidence that biases due to model misspecification
may plausibly explain the SRH effect.
In what follows, we report a set of 14 new experiments conducted as part of what we
call a quasi-adversarial collaboration and combine these with a reanalysis of the 5 original
experiments. The term “adversarial collaboration” has been used to refer to experimental
research projects jointly planned and executed by two or more researchers (or research
groups) who have ex-ante conflicting hypotheses about its outcome (for discussion and
examples see Bateman et al. 2005; Corrigan, 2011; Kahneman, 2003; Latham et al. 1988;
Mellers et al. 2001). While our collaboration does not have exactly this form (hence the
qualifier ‘quasi’), the seven researchers involved in this collaboration come from different
disciplines (economics and psychology), different labs, and have very different degrees of
prior investment in the competing theoretical frameworks that would be supported or
challenged by the existence of the SRH effect. We also use the qualifier “quasi’ to signal that
the set of experiments reported here did not emerge from a common plan of adversarial
collaboration agreed before any of the experiments began. Instead, our collaboration emerged
as subsets of the present co-authors began to discover that we were undertaking very closely
related work exploring the SRH effect, independently, at different labs. We then began to
compare results and, later, to discuss designs for new experiments. Further experiments were
subsequently run by different sub-groups of us, based in three different labs at two
universities, using a mixture of lab-based and online protocols. The development of the
designs involved varying degrees of consultation between us, as well as key variations in
designs and procedures, which we document below. Through this process we have generated
a rich source of evidence relative to the SRH effect, which we bring together in this paper.
The somewhat organic evolution of the collaboration does not mean that the set of
replications, when viewed as a whole, lacks structure. We will argue that, although we did not
set out with this explicit purpose, the resultant set of experiments reflect and, indeed, extend a
replication strategy proposed by Levitt and List (2009). They advocate a methodology
involving replication at three levels: reanalysing data from the original study to be replicated;
running fresh experiments using designs approximating the experiment to be replicated and
thirdly, conditional on replicating the original results, running experiments to probe origins of
the phenomenon observed. Our experiments involve replication at all three levels but we also
add a further dimension to our analysis. Through our experiments, we generated a rich data
set based on decisions of 1880 subjects which we use to run a composite analysis combining
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analysis’1. This complements the individual experiments by placing confidence bounds on the
size of the SRH effect and allowing assessment of how it varies with some key design
features of our replications. As such we interpret part of our contribution as piloting an
extended, four level, version of the Levitt and List (2009) methodology enhanced by meta-
analysis. While the meta-analysis confirms a non-zero effect size, our experiments and
simulations combined, cast the SRH effect in an entirely new light.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews key features and findings of the
original SRH study. Section III presents results from all four levels of the replication process.
Section IV considers alternative explanations for the SRH effect and Section V concludes.
I. The Original SRH (2015) study: setup, motivation, methodology and results
The main results in the original SRH study are based on data generated from
experiments in which individuals had to make a series of choices between pairs of gambles of
the form “p chance of x, otherwise nothing” or “q chance of y, otherwise nothing” (where p<q
and y<x). SRH used these data to estimate utility functions over monetary payoffs (x, y) by
fitting an expected utility model and probability weighting functions over probabilities (p, q)
by fitting a subjective expected utility model.
All experiments followed the same logic whereby, for any given treatment, a fixed set
of (five or six) money amounts was fully crossed with a fixed set of (five or six) probabilities
to create a set of gambles. This was then used to generate a set of pairwise choices, for any
given treatment of the experiment, comprising all possible non-identical and stochastically
non-dominant pairwise choices from the full set of gambles. A further 30 choices were added
in which one option stochastically dominated as a catch for participants paying insufficient
attention; those who chose dominated options in more than 10% of catch trials were excluded
from the main analysis. The order of choices was randomized across participants.
There were two treatments in each experiment which varied according to either the
skew in the distribution of money amounts, or the skew in the distribution of probabilities,
used in construction of the choice sets. Each experiment then involved comparison of a
treatment with a positive-skew distribution (of money amounts or probabilities) against a
treatment with either a negative-skew or a zero-skew distribution (of money amounts or
probabilities). It was comparisons between these pairs of treatments which generated the
SRH effect. The actual amounts and probabilities used in five of the different experiments
reported by SRH are depicted in Table 1.
1 Although this analysis exploits all the currently existing data that we are aware of relating to the SRH effect, it is
a limited exercise in the sense of relying on data that come from our own and from SRH’s previous experiments.
5Table 1. Amounts and probabilities used in the original SRH experiments to create the choice sets.
Experiment* Domain Skew Amounts (£) Probabilities (%)
SRH 1A Utility
Positive
vs.
Negative
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500
vs.
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 1B Utility
Positive
vs.
Zero
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500
vs.
0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 1C Utility
Positive
vs.
Zero
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
SRH 2A Probability
Positive
vs.
Negative
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
10, 20, 30, 40, 70, 90
vs.
10, 30, 60, 70, 80, 90
SRH 2B Probability
Positive
vs.
Negative
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99
vs.
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99
*Note: There was an additional series of temporal discounting experiments, which we do not address in this paper.
6Notice that the first three experiments in Table 1 (Experiments SRH 1A-1C) test for
the SRH effect in the utility domain by varying the distributions of the money amounts
between treatments, holding constant the set of probabilities used to construct the set of
gambles. For example, in Experiment SRH 1A, the gambles are constructed using a common
set of probabilities in both treatments (ranging from 20% to 100% in 20% steps); whereas the
money amounts range from £10 to £500 in both treatments but for one treatment (the positive-
skew distribution) the intermediate outcomes are all in the lower half of the range, while for
the other treatment (the negative-skew distribution) all of the intermediate outcomes are in the
upper half of the range. These experiments test how changing the distribution of money
amounts changes the revealed utility functions. In the last two experiments depicted in Table
1 (SRH 2A and 2B) the distribution of amounts is common across treatments for each
experiment, but the distribution of probabilities changes between them. These experiments
tested for the SRH effect in the probability domain by examining the sensitivity of resulting
probability weighting functions to changes in the distribution of probabilities.
Figure 1. Interface used in SRH 1A.
An example of the choice interface, based on SRH 1A, is shown in Figure 1. At the
top of the screen participants saw the distributions of chances to win and prizes on offer
across the set of choices. In most experiments, this information was on screen continuously
while subjects made their decisions.2 Although subjects were not explicitly informed about
2 Having this information on screen continuously does not appear to be a decisive factor. For Experiment SRH 1B,
subjects completed the series of choices without the distribution of chances and prizes on offer being shown on
7the number of choices they had to make they were told about the likely duration of the
experiment and a bar at the bottom of the screen kept track of their progress. The number of
unique non-dominated pairwise choices was 150 for Experiments SRH 1A and SRH 2B, 120
for Experiments SRH 1B and SRH 2A and 100 for Experiment SRH 1C. After making each
decision, the next choice appeared automatically. In any given choice, the two gambles were
presented in the form of text on separate ‘buttons’ and subjects indicated their decision by
clicking on one of them. They were told that at the end of the experiment one of their choices
would be randomly selected and their chosen gamble would be played out and paid for real
using an exchange rate: 1 pound equals 1 pence.3 All SRH original experiments were
conducted at the University of Warwick (with one run online).
In a moment we will review the main findings of SRH. As a prelude to that, we note
that the treatment comparisons in SRH have a particular theoretical motivation because, as
SRH explain, the DbS model predicts systematic differences between them. The DbS model
is a mechanism for the construction of choices from a series of ordinal comparisons between
pairs of attribute values. Readers interested in the details of the DbS model should consult
Stewart (2009), Stewart et al. (2006), and SRH (2015). For now, the following property is
sufficient: Because the probability that an attribute value will win an ordinal comparison is
given by its rank position within those attribute values available, DbS predicts people will
choose as if subjective value is the rank position of an attribute value within all those
available. For example, consider the evaluation of the amount £200 in the context of the
distributions used in Experiment SRH 1B. In the positive-skew treatment where the amounts
are £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500, the £200 outcome is better than 4 out of 5 of the
other outcomes that will be encountered. But now consider the evaluation of £200 in the
context of the zero-skew treatment of Experiment SRH 1B with the distribution of £0, £100,
£200, £300, £400, £500. In this case, £200 is better than only 2 out of 5 other outcomes that
will be encountered. Thus, DbS implies a higher utility for £200 in the positive-skew
treatment, compared to its utility in the zero-skew treatment.
Figure 2 shows the estimated utility and weighting functions for all five SRH original
experiments. In line with DbS predictions, the utility functions (utility experiments, Figures
2a, 2b, 2c) and the weighting functions (probability experiments, Figures 2d, 2e) were more
concave when the skew in the distribution of amounts or probabilities was positive than when
it was negative or zero. For example, the utility for £200 in SRH 1B is lower in the zero-skew
treatment than in the positive-skew treatment. The intuition from DbS is that, because
screen during choices. This experiment produced qualitatively very similar results to Experiment SRH 1C which
used almost identical amounts and did have the distribution of chances and prizes on screen.
3 In Experiment SRH 1A two choices were randomly selected for payment. The exchange rate was halved for this
experiment. In Experiment SRH 1C the choices were hypothetical rather than incentivized.
8subjective value is given by rank position, subjective value must increase most quickly where
attribute value densities are highest. This means a steeper increase early on, for distributions
with positive-skew compared to distributions with negative- or zero-skew.
Figure 2. The revealed utility and probability weighting functions from SRH.
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Adapted from SRH (Figures 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, and 5b respectively).
(a)
(d)(c)
(b)
(e)
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We now present the results of our new analysis. This involves four levels of
replication, extending the methodology advocated by Levitt and List (2009) with an
additional stage of meta-analysis to take advantage of the rich data set generated via our new
experiments. In terms of data analysis, our strategy is to use methods which are essentially the
same as those applied by SRH, except for some refinements explained below. We then hold
constant the statistical methods that we apply across the four levels of replication reported in
this study.4 Analysis for each of the four levels is presented as a separate subsection.
A. Level 1: Replication by reanalysing the original data
As step one, we reanalysed SRH’s original experimental data to estimate the revealed
utility and weighting functions. Specifically, we fit an expected utility model with a Luce
(1959)-Shepard (1957)5 choice rule incorporating a stochastic component to estimate utilities.
ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܥℎ݋݋݁ݏ ܽݏ ݂݁ ) = ௕௜௔௦(௤௨(௬))ം
௕௜௔௦(௤௨(௬))ംା(௣௨(௫))ം (1)
Here ݑ(ݕ) is the utility of the safer gamble’s prize which occurs with probability ݍ, while
ݑ(ݔ) is the utility of the riskier gamble’s prize which occurs with probability ݌; ܾ݅ ܽݏis a
general tendency to choose safe irrespective of the actual amounts and probabilities on offer;
and ߛ controls the level of determinism in responding (ߛ=1 gives choice probabilities
proportional to the expected utilities, and ߛ>1 gives more extreme choice probabilities, so
gambles with a slightly higher expected utility are very likely to be chosen).
The advantage of this model, though it is perhaps not obvious, is that for simple
gambles it can be estimated as the following logistic regression:logቂ ௉௥௢௕(஼௛௢௢௦௘௦௔௙௘)
ଵି௉௥௢௕(஼௛௢௢௦௘௦௔௙௘)ቃ= ߥ+ ߱ logቀ௤௣ቁ+ ∑ ߚ௜௜ ܺ௜(2)
In Equation 2, each ܺ௜ is a dummy variable indicating the presence of amount i as y (coded
+1), as x (coded -1), or absent from the choice (coded 0); ν = log(ܾ݅ ܽݏ); ߱ = ߛ; and the
utility of each amount ݑ( )݅ = exp(ߚ௜/ߛ).
A corresponding logistic regression for estimating weights for probabilities is obtained by
exchanging the roles of p and q and of x and y.logቂ ௉௥௢௕(௦௔௙௘)
ଵି௉௥௢௕(௦௔௙௘)ቃ= ߥ+ ߱ logቀ௬௫ቁ+ ∑ ߚ௜௜ ܺ௜ (3)
where the weighting of each probability is given by ݓ(݌௜) = ݁ݔ݌(ߚ௜/ߛ).
SRH give further details in their Appendix A.
4 While one could entertain different approaches to modelling, basing our approach on that used by SRH
minimizes the chance that differences between our results and theirs are due to modelling differences; and holding
the approach constant within our analysis allows us to rule out the possibility that differences across our
experiments or levels of replication could be plausibly attributed to our statistical modelling methodology.
5 Our results are qualitatively the same using the multinomial logit model of McFadden (1976, 2001).
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Our analysis departs from the original analysis in SRH by using a different approach
to estimate confidence intervals. We used a more reliable bootstrapping method instead of the
standard errors from the model fits used by SRH, because we wanted to allow for the
possibility of asymmetric confidence intervals. Furthermore, we estimated the revealed
functions separately for each treatment. SRH used one model for both treatments, but this is
not ideal; random effects cannot be estimated for all amounts for all participants, because
each participant experienced only a subset of amounts. While Level 1 replication identified
some minor calculation errors in SRH’s original analysis, these did not change the
conclusions of the original paper. A detailed comparison between SRH’s original analysis
with and without those calculation errors can be found in Appendix A.
The revealed functions from the replication analysis are shown in Figure 3. The
panels correspond to those in Figure 2, where the original experiments are presented. For
example, a direct comparison for Experiment SRH 1A shows that the replicated functions
depicted in Figure 3a strongly mirror the original functions depicted in Figure 2a. The same
result holds for all experiments. Hence, we conclude that the Level 1 analysis successfully
replicates the SRH effect in both the utility and probability domains.
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Figure 3. The revealed functions obtained from the replication analysis.
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
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B. Level 2 Replication using variants of the original design
In this section, we report a series of eight new experiments run by different subsets of
the current authors. Each was designed to replicate one of the original SRH experiments but
with several design variations introduced across our studies as set out below.
Table 2 presents the details of the Level 2 experiments. For example, at the top of the
table, the experiment labelled “L2.a” is a replication of the original Experiment SRH 1C
comparing positive-skew and zero-skew distributions of money amounts. The distributions of
money amounts and probabilities correspond exactly with those in SRH 1C. Subsequent
columns of Table 2 indicate that L2.a was an incentivized experiment with 54 participants at
University 1 using 75 randomly selected choices from the original study.
Looking further down Table 2, you will see that we have replicated examples of both
the utility and the probability weighting experiments, though there is a focus on the utility
domain. This is partly an accident of history reflecting decisions made in the different labs
when they started running these experiments independently. But, a focus on the utility domain
may, nevertheless, be useful for several reasons. First, utility is arguably a more fundamental
concept, compared to probability weighting, in models derived from the preference theoretic
framework; it features in a wider class of models and it is the core subjective dimension in
what has been the leading theory of risk preference–that is, expected utility theory.
While this focus seems justified by these arguments, we also wished to include at
least one Level 2 test in the probability domain – hence the inclusion L2.h (additional
experiments with manipulations of probability are reported as part of Level 3 replications).
Notice that across the series of experiments there is variation in: the skew (positive-
vs negative- or zero-skew), the domain (utility or probability), the location (group that
conducted the experiment), whether the experiment was conducted online or in the lab, the
number of participants, the number of trials and the incentives (by using both incentivized and
hypothetical experiments).
We think there is some advantage in focusing on particular SRH experiments to see
the effects of small changes in procedures holding constant the distributions of amounts and
probabilities. For this purpose we used SRH 1C, which contrasted positive-skew with zero-
skew distributions of outcome values making Experiments L2.a-L2.e different replications of
SRH 1C. The advantages of choosing to replicate mainly the Experiment SRH 1C are
twofold: First, we can use the difference between the utilities of the common amounts for a
direct comparison (there are no common amounts between the positive-negative conditions);
Second, the round amounts used in the zero-skew condition are more representative of
amounts often experienced by subjects in other experiments.
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Table 2. Outline of the properties of all replication experiments from Level 2.
Replication
(Original)
Skew Domain Amounts (£ or $)* Probabilities (%) Location
(Sample)
Nǂ No. Trials¥ Incentives
L2.a (SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(Student sample) 54
Mean of 75 randomly
selected Course credit plus up to £5
L2.b (SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(Prolific Academic) 200 150 £1.80 (non-incentivized)
L2.c (SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(MTurk) 492 40 $1.80 (non-incentivized)
L2.d (SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(MTurk) 145
Mean of 75 randomly
selected $1.80 (non-incentivized)
L2.e (SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1 (50%
MTurk and 50%
Prolific Academic)
183 150 $2.25 or £1.50 and up to$/£25
L2.f (SRH 1A)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.10, 310, 410, 460, 490,
500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 2
(Student sample) 40 180 £0 up to £5
L2.g (New
distribution)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility
5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200,
500
vs. 5, 300, 400, 450, 480,
490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(MTurk) 154 180 $3 (non-incentivized)
L2.h (SRH 2B)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Probability
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99
vs.
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99
University 2
(Student sample) 29 180 £0 up to £5
Notes: *We used $ for all Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples and £ for all Prolific Academic and student samples. In Experiments L2.f and L2.h, where the experiment was conducted
using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited via the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), a show-up fee of £7 was added to the earnings from the experiment.
ǂ Catch trials were not included in replication Experiments L2.b, L2.c, L2.d, L2.e and L2.g. 2 subjects violated dominance in more than 10% of catch trials in experiment L2.f and 1 in
experiment L2.h. These subjects were excluded from further analysis. In Experiment L2.e we decided in advance to take the conservative approach of removing people in the 5% of fastest or
slowest people, all multiple submissions from the same IP address, and the 5% of people who alternated the most or the least between left and right responses. We removed 56 participants based
on the above criteria that are not included on the reported sample size.
¥ In Experiments L2.a, L2.c and L2.d we ran fewer trials to make the duration of the experiment shorter. This allowed us to run the experiment with as many participants as possible within a
fixed budget.
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We also replicate SRH 1A, comparing positive-skew and negative-skew in the
distributions of amounts in a different lab than SRH 1A (our Experiment L2.f). In
Experiment L2.g we pushed the boundaries further by creating a distribution different from
all the experiments reported in SRH and by collecting the data online. Finally, L2.h is a
replication of SRH 2B and hence in the probability domain.
Figure 4: Revealed functions from the replication experiments in Level 2.
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
(a) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h)
(b)
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To estimate the utility and probability weighting functions, we followed the same
procedure as in Level 1; that is, we fitted Equations (2) and (3) to the choice data for the
utility and the probability experiments respectively. Figure 4 shows the revealed utility and
weighting functions from the set of Level 2 replications. For example, the top left panel of
Figure 4 depicts the revealed utility functions from Experiment L2.a, where the resulting
functions were more concave in the positive-skew treatment compared to the zero-skew
treatment: Subjects assigned higher utilities to the common amounts of £100 and £200 when
they experienced them in the positive-skew treatment (relative to the zero-skew treatment).
Eyeballing of Figure 4 reveals that the SRH effect is replicated in seven of the eight
Level 2 experiments: in all cases apart from Experiment L2.e, we see a more concave utility
function in the positive-skew treatment compared to the other (negative-skew or zero-skew)
treatment. While we cannot rule out other interpretations, it seems possible that the failure to
replicate in L2.e may be due to random error. Either way, however, this overall pattern of
results is strong evidence that the SRH effect is replicable and robust to a range of changes in
procedures and subject pools.
C. Level 3: Replication by implementing a new design
While our Level 2 analysis provides substantial evidence of robustness in the SRH
effect, it does not show whether the conceptual interpretation of the original finding is correct.
We therefore proceeded to a form of analysis in the spirit of Level 3 in Levitt and List’s
(2009) taxonomy. They suggest that Level 3 replication should involve creating alternative
experimental designs, in order to test the same hypothesis as that tested in the original target
of replication. We use a twofold strategy to stress test the explanation of the SRH effect based
on DbS; first, we conduct new experiments in which, conditional on the truth of the DbS
account, it may be harder for the SRH effect to work; second, we run tests in which,
conditional on the truth of the DbS mechanism, we will eliminate the SRH effect altogether.
To this end, in one series of Level 3 experiments, which we refer to as flagged
experiments, we used a within-subjects design and presented participants with choice options
originating from two different choice sets, one with a positive-skew distribution and the other
with a negative-skew distribution. For example, in Experiment L3.a, choices with prizes from,
say, the positive-skew distribution were presented in videos by “Joanne”, a young British
woman. Choices with prizes from, say, the negative-skew distribution were presented by
“Patrick”, an older North American man with a significant beard. If participants can track the
distributions of prizes separately depending on which speaker is making the offer, then DbS
predicts that people will respond to the different speakers as if they have different utility
functions for each speaker! In Experiment L3.b, the different-speaker manipulation was
replaced with a different-product manipulation. In some choices people chose between
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lotteries for holidays with different values and, in other choices, between lotteries for mobile
phones with different values. Again, if people can track the values separately for the different
types of product, DbS predicts people will respond as if they have different utility functions
for different types of product value. Thus, if participants can simultaneously keep track of the
two separate distributions and choose as if their decisions are informed by applying DbS
separately to choices that come from the separate distributions, then retrospectively splitting
the combined choice set into the original two sets for the analysis will yield the same effects
as in the original between-subjects experiments. On the other hand, we do not know that
individuals would try to use flags and separate the distributions accordingly. Even if they did,
it seems possible that SRH effects might be reduced due to interference and imperfect
memory. As such our flagged experiments provide a tougher environment for the operation of
the mechanisms imputed by DbS.
Our second series of Level 3 replication experiments (which we label non-flagged)
used the same within-subjects design just described, except we provided no flags (such as
speaker or product type). Hence, in non-flagged experiments participants had no way of
knowing what distribution the choices belonged to and therefore had no way of attributing
choices to one distribution or another. As such, while a DbS model would still imply that any
measured utility and probability weighting functions would depend on the background
distributions of probabilities and amounts, in these experiments there is effectively only a
single background distribution provided in the experiment. Yet, as experimenters, for the
purpose of analysis we can still retrospectively split the data and analyse them separately for
the two different distributions we used to generate the choices. Were we to do this, however,
according to DbS, the SRH effect should disappear. So, if we continue to observe the SRH
effect in our non-flagged designs that would be evidence against DbS’s proposed mechanism
as the cause of this context effect. Indeed, it would be a finding that no existing model we are
aware of could account for.
Because of the completely within-subjects nature of these experiments, we reverted to
the original SRH modelling by fitting one model to both conditions in an experiment.
Random effects can now be estimated within one model, because all participants experience
the attribute values from both distributions. In the logistic regression form, the model looks as
follows for the experiments estimating a utility function:logቂ ௉௥௢௕(஼௛௢௢௦௘௦௔௙௘)
ଵି௉௥௢௕(஼௛௢௢௦௘௦௔௙௘)ቃ= ߥ+ ߬ܿ ݋݊ ݀+ ߱ logቀ௤௣ቁ+ ܿߦ ݋݊ ݀ logቀ௤௣ቁ+ ∑ ߚ௜௜ ܺ௜(4)
An addition to the model described in Equation 2 are the terms involving cond. In expression4 , cond is a dummy to account for the two conditions (0 indicates the positive-skew; 1
indicates the other condition). Setting log(ܾ݅ ܽݏ௖௢௡ௗ) = ߥ+ ߬ܿ݋݊ ,݀ ߛ௖௢௡ௗ = ߱ + ߦܿ݋݊ ,݀
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and ݑ௖௢௡ௗ(ܽ݉ ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜= ߱ + ݁ݔ݌(ߚ௜/ߛ௖௢௡ௗ) follows, when Equation 1 is adapted to account
for both conditions. To estimate probability weighting functions, we fit the following model:logቂ ௉௥௢௕(௦௔௙௘)
ଵି௉௥௢௕(௦௔௙௘)ቃ= ߥ+ ߬ܿ ݋݊ ݀+ ߱ logቀ௬௫ቁ+ ܿߦ ݋݊ ݀ logቀ௬௫ቁ+ ∑ ߚ௜௜ ܺ௜(5)
and calculate the weights via ݓ௖௢௡ௗ(݌௜) = ݁ݔ݌(ߚ௜/ߛ௖௢௡ௗ). These are exactly the models
estimated by SRH (see their Appendix A) and are extensions of our Equations 2 and 3.
Table 3 summarises the set of Level 3 experiments. As in Level 2, we varied the
domain, the location, the incentives, the number of trials, the number of participants, and
whether the experiment was conducted online or in the lab. For example, the second row of
Table 3 describes the details of Experiment L3.a, which used the positive- vs. negative-skew
in the distribution of amounts from the original Experiment SRH 1A and flagged them by
labelling prizes as either mobile phones or holidays.
18
Table 3. Outline of the properties of all experiments from Level 3.
Replication (Original) Skew Domain Amounts (£ or $)± Probabilities (%) Location
(Sample)
N No. Trials Incentives
Flagged Experiments
L3.a
(SRH 1A)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility 10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500
vs.
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 2
(Student sample)
48 330 Course credit (non-
incentivized)
L3.b
(SRH 1A)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility 10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500
vs.
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(Student sample)
42 160 Some for course credit
some were paid £6 plus
up to £5
Non-flagged Experiments
L3.c
(SRH 1A)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 2
(Student sample)
45 450 Course credit (non-
incentivized)
L3.d
(SRH 1A)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 2
(Student Sample)
50 450 £0 to £5
L3.e
(SRH 1C)
Positive
vs.
Zero
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
vs.
20, 40, 60, 80, 100
University 1
(50% MTurk and
50% Prolific
Academic)
89 140 $2.25 or £1.50 and up to
$/£25
L3.f
(SRH 2B)
Positive
vs.
Negative
Probability 100, 200, 300, 400, 500
vs.
100, 200, 300, 400, 500
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99
vs.
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99
University 2
(Student sample)
49 390 £0 to £5
Notes: ±We used $ for all Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples and £ for all Prolific Academic and student samples. In Experiments L3.d and L3.f, where the experiment was conducted
using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) subjects were recruited via the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), a show-up fee of £7 was added to their earnings.
Catch trials were not included in replication Experiments L3.b and L3.e. 1 subject violated dominance in more than 10% of catch trials in Experiment L3.d and 3 in Experiment L3.f. These
subjects were excluded from further analysis. In Experiment L3.e, we decided in advance to remove the 5% of fastest or slowest people, all multiple submissions from the same IP address, and
the 5% of people who alternated the most or the least between left and right responses. We removed 32 participants on these criteria that are not included on the reported sample size.
In Experiments L3.b, L3.e we ran fewer trials with as many participants as possible within a fixed budget.
The flagged experiments were as follows: In Experiment L3.a for half of the participants 150 positively skewed choices were framed as holidays and 150 negatively skewed choices were
framed as mobile phones. For other participants it was the other way around; in Experiment L3.b the choice options from the different distributions were described by different people using
video recordings. For half of the participants, Patrick described 80 gambles from the positively skewed set and Joanne described 80 gambles from the negatively skewed set; for the other half,
this assignment was reversed.
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We present the main results of Level 3 analysis in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Revealed functions from the replications of SRH in Level 3 using a within-subjects
design.
Notes: L3.a-L3.b involve flagged choices, L3.c-L3.f do not. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
The top two panels of Figure 5 show results for the flagged experiments (L3.a and
L3.b) where participants could potentially track what distribution the attributes in the choice
set belonged to. The difference between the revealed utility functions for the two differently
(a) (b)
(f)(e)
(d)(c)
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distributed samples of amounts remain: the utility function using the choices from the choice
set with positive-skew is more concave than the one from the choice set with negative-skew.
Surprisingly – and in contrast to DbS predictions – when estimating the revealed
utility and weighting functions in the non-flagged experiments (L3.c-L3.f), the comparison of
curves within each panel still shows the pattern of an SRH effect. It is hard to see how these
differences can be rationalized with the DbS model, hence, the Level 3 results at least
partially challenge the DbS interpretation of the SRH effect. We consider possible
explanations for these results in Section IV below.
D. Level 4: Meta-analysis
The nineteen experiments we have analysed in this study (including the five Level 1
cases from the original SRH study) provide a large data set, based on the decisions of 1880
subjects, and are suitable for conducting a meta-analysis in order to examine the overall size,
variability, and moderators of the effect of context on utility and probability weighting
functions. We see this as a useful complement to the replication analysis of Levels 1 – 3 and so
as a natural extension of the Levitt and List methodology, in cases where a suitable, comparably
rich, data set has been generated.6
We first estimated the overall effect size using the differences in the revealed utility
and weighting functions between conditions across all experiments for one attribute value.
Subsequently, we calculated the effect sizes separately for: (i) the between-subjects design
experiments; (ii) the within-subjects flagged experiments; and (iii) the within-subjects non-
flagged experiments. From an explanatory point of view, the comparison of results for
experiments in categories (i) and (iii) is especially interesting: If the within-subjects
experiments’ non-flagged effect size were as big as the between-subjects experiments’ effect
size, we could reject the DbS interpretation of the context effects, because the effect in the non-
flagged experiments cannot emerge through the mechanisms proposed by DbS. However, if the
effect size in the non-flagged within-subjects design experiments is smaller, DbS could still
remain a candidate model for the interpretation of some part of the SRH effect.
For the effect size measure, we identified the amount or the probability that was
common to the two distributions in a given experiment and calculated the difference between
the utility (or weighting) functions of the two distributions at that point. If no attribute was
common within an experiment, we picked the two attribute values that were most similar to
each other across the positive- and zero- or negative-skew distributions. For the experiments
comparing zero- vs positive-skew, £200 (or $200) occurs in both distributions, so we
6 We do not consider a meta-analysis of replication studies generated from a quasi-adversarial collaboration as a
sufficient condition to obtain a definitive estimate of the underlying effect sizes. However, we regard it as an
important step in the right direction.
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subtracted the utility estimate of £200 in the zero-skew treatment from the utility of £200 in
the positive-skew treatment. For experiments with positive- vs. negative-skew distributions of
amounts, we calculated the difference between the estimated utility of £200 and the utility of
£310 for the utility experiments (we used the £200 vs. £300 comparison for Experiment
L2.g). Note that DbS predicts £200 in the positive-skew condition to be a higher utility than
£310 in the negative-skew condition. The fact that £310 is a higher number than £200 makes
this a conservative comparison. For the experiments manipulating the probability distribution
we calculated the difference between the estimated probability weights of the common 30%
(for SRH 2A replications) and the common 50% (for SRH 2B replications) in each condition.
We fitted a linear random effects model to estimate the effect of experimental design
(between vs. flagged within vs. non-flagged within) and the skewness comparison (positive-
negative vs. positive-zero) using mean differences.7 The results of the meta-analysis are
depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Meta-analysis results from Level 4 replication.
Note: Mean Differences and 95% confidence intervals are shown as a function of the experimental design
for between-subjects, and for flagged and non-flagged within-subject experiments.
7 The estimations were obtained by using the metafor package in R by Viechtbauer (2010).
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Figure 6 shows that our best estimate of the difference between the revealed utility or
probability weight of the common attribute between the two distributions (positive-negative
skew comparison or positive-zero skew comparison) overall is 0.17 95% CI [0.13, 0.22] on a
scale where, arbitrarily, the utility of £500 for the utility experiments and the weight of 99%
in the probability experiments are fixed at 1. Thus, taking all our experiments and SRH’s
experiments into consideration, the meta-analysis confirms a positive SRH effect in our data.
We estimated the effect of distribution comparison (positive-negative vs. positive-
zero). The estimates do not differ between distribution comparisons, but could potentially
differ by approximately 0.10 in each direction, (betaDistribution = 0.00 95% CI [-0.10, 0.09]).
That is, the difference between the estimated utility of £200 from the positive-skew condition
and £200 from the zero-skew condition is similar to the difference between the utility of £200
in the positive-skew condition and the utility of £310 in the negative-skew condition.
However, there might be slight differences as the confidence interval is reasonably wide,
leaving open the possibility that there are real differences between positive- vs zero-skew
comparisons and positive- vs negative-skew comparisons.
Looking at the effect sizes for the three designs separately, the effect is largest in the
between-subjects experiments (MDbetween=0.19 95% CI [0.14, 0.24]). The effect is reduced in
the flagged within-subjects experiments (MDflagged_within=0.14 95% CI [-0.03, 0.32]) and is
smallest–with a reduction of 30% of the between-subjects experiments–in the non-flagged
within-subjects experiments (MDnon-flagged_within=0.13 95% CI [0.03, 0.24]). According to the
meta-analytic model, the differences could be very small, or they could be opposite, such that
the effects are larger in the non-flagged experiments, or it could be that the difference
between the between-subjects experiments and the non-flagged experiments is about as large
as the effect itself in the non-flagged experiments, (betaDesign = 0.04 95% CI [-0.04, 0.12]).
Given that the DbS account cannot apply to the non-flagged experiments, and the effect size
in the non-flagged experiments is estimated to be similar to the two other groups, it is likely
that much of the effect in the flagged and between-subject experiments should not be
attributed to the DbS model. In light of this, what might explain the SRH effect in our data?
The next section addresses this question directly.
III. Understanding the SRH effect
In the light of Level 3 non-flagged experiments showing an SRH effect even where it
is not predicted by DbS, an obvious question to ask is whether the SRH effect might be
explained as an artefact of this genre of experiment and its method of analysis. To motivate
this possibility, we note that the recipe used to generate the choice sets in SRH style
experiments, while based on a simple and coherent strategy for testing predictions of DbS,
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may not generate sufficiently informative choice sets for unbiased parameter recovery, when
applying the estimation procedures adopted by SRH and followed by us.8
The analysis is also characterised by a particular underlying choice model which may
not be correctly specified. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether the SRH effect
could be, at least in part, a systematic bias arising from some limitation of the model or
estimation procedures to recover underlying preference parameters (if those exist) from the
choice data these experiments generate.
We explore this possibility in two ways: first by seeing whether it is possible to
identify patterns predicted by DbS which are akin to the SRH effect, but based on analysis
that does not involve filtering the data through an estimating model; second, we examine how
the SRH effect might emerge as an artefact of modelling inferences.
A. Model-free tests for effects predicted by Decision by Sampling
The data available to us provide a simple way of testing for an effect predicted by
DbS that is closely akin to the SRH effect but using a form of analysis based on direct
examination of choice data, thus short–circuiting the need for model fitting.
Within a given experiment, we can identify a number of identical choices for a given
pair of gambles which occur in both treatments (or skews) of a given experiment. We focus
this analysis on type 1C experiments because these provide numerous opportunities for this
type of analysis and all of the comparisons are based on large sample sizes (see Figure 7 for
details). Type 1C experiments feature money amounts of £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and
£500 in the positive-skew treatment and amounts of £100, £200, £300, £400, and £500 in the
zero-skew treatment. Given the recipe for constructing choices, both treatments feature
multiple choices between identical pairs of gambles each involving two of the three amounts
£100, £200, £500. This affords a direct opportunity to test a prediction of DbS according to
which the likelihood of choosing, say, the safer of the two gambles in any such pair should
vary, predictably, between treatments. To see why, consider a choice between a 20% chance
of £500 and a safer option of an 80% chance of £100. DbS predicts more frequent choice of
the safer option in positive-skew treatments (where 100 is the third best outcome) as
compared to when the same choice is embedded in the zero-skew (where £100 is the worst
amount).
Within the data gathered for Type 1C experiments we identify 20 opportunities for
testing whether such comparisons reveal support for predictions of DbS. We apply a random
effects meta-analysis using odds ratios of the probability of choosing safe divided by the
8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing an analysis suggesting that differently skewed choice sets
may indeed be differentially informative for revealing underlying preferences.
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probability of choosing risky. Figure 7 shows the odds ratios for each of the 20 choices and
their 95% confidence intervals. The number in brackets next to the description of each choice
(e.g. 841 for the first row of the table) is the total number of decisions on which the relevant
test is based, aggregating across the pair of treatments; while the number of subjects is not
generally equal across a pair of treatments, every choice in every treatment involved at least
300 subjects. The overall odds ratio is 0.90, 95% CI [0.83, 0.97], which indicates that, across
the set of 20 comparisons, subjects are less likely to choose the safer option when they are in
the positive-skew as opposed to the zero-skew treatment.9,10 The direction of this difference,
however, is the opposite of that predicted by DbS. This mode of model-free analysis,
therefore, provides no support for the effect predicted by DbS.
Figure 7. Meta-analysis of model-free tests (odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals).
9 Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate an increase in the probability of choosing safe in the positive-skew treatment.
Odds ratios less than one indicate a decrease.
10 Our results also hold, qualitatively, using Pearson chi-square tests for pairwise comparisons.
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B. Possible alternative explanations for the SRH effect
We now explore how the SRH effects observed in the model based analysis might
have arisen, assuming they have nothing to do with DbS. We pursue this using simulation
analysis. We begin by using a very simple preference model to generate synthetic choice data
for the choice sets associated with both the 1A and 1C Experiments. We choose these two
experiments because they are the ones which feature most commonly in the above
replications. We then attempt to recover the preference function generating the data, using the
SRH estimation procedure that we have applied throughout.
We generate data for 200 simulated agents who chose according to the sign of the net
perceived expected utility = [EU(C1) - EU(C2) + ε]. In this expression, EU(C1) and EU(C2) are
the expected utilities of a given pair of choice options where ε  Ν(0, 2) is a random error,
which may be interpreted as capturing imperfectly implemented preferences due to
carelessness or miscalculation (see Hey and Orme, 1994). A simulated agent selects C1 (resp.
C2) in any given choice, when the net perceived expected utility is positive (resp. negative).
We use a standard power function for utility over consequences with u(x)=xα and we repeat
the exercise for three data sets generated using different, but unexceptional, values of α (i.e., 
0.8, 0.9 and 1.0). Following standard approaches in the literature modelling real choice
behaviour, we use two different error specifications with either constant variance; or range
sensitive variance. In the first case, the error is drawn from the same distribution for each
pairwise choice and 2 depends on the average range between payoffs in the choice set. In the
second specification (following Bruhin et al. 2010; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010, 2011), the error
variance is determined separately for each choice and is proportional to the outcome range for
that choice. Both error specifications are widely used in studies that fit preference models to
real choice data. Moreover, it has been shown that incorporating heteroscedastic error
structures greatly improves the relative fit of expected utility (see Blavatskyy and Pogrebna,
2010; Buschena and Zilberman, 2000; Hey, 1995; Hey and Orme, 1994; Wilcox, 2011).
Figure 8 shows the results of simulations for Experiments 1A (left hand panels) and
1C (right hand panels). Results for all four panels are generated with α = 0.9, but the 
qualitative patterns revealed in Figure 8 also hold for both the risk neutral and the more risk
averse preferences too. The top two panels report results for the constant error model while
the two bottom panels report results for the range sensitive error. In each panel, we plot
separate functions estimated for choices based on positive and zero-skew choice sets. We also
plot the true utility function used to generate the data.
Consider first the top two panels (constant error variance). At the eyeball level, the
estimated functions approximate the true preferences rather well and there is no evidence of
an SRH effect.
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Things look quite different, however, when we consider the bottom panels (range
sensitive error variance). In this case, we observe marked differences between the functions
estimated on positive versus zero-skew choice sets; moreover, the differences we observe (i.e.
more concave function for positive-skew) are consistent with the SRH effect predicted by
DbS and those found in the experimental choice data.
Figure 8: Recovered functions for choices based on simulated data with added noise
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
In this simulation exercise, we consistently find that systematic biases in the recovery
of underlying preferences generate the SRH effect for agents who choose according to
expected utility theory with an heteroskedastic error. While we do not wish to argue for the
claim that expected utility preferences with range-sensitive errors provide a good general
model of behaviour for real subjects in these experiments, we interpret this exercise as
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demonstrating that failure to recover underlying preferences is a plausible candidate
explanation for the SRH effect because we can mimic that effect in a simulated environment
where agents choose according to a very simple and rather standard preference model.
Imposing a heteroskedastic error structure on the EU model is not the only way in
which we can mimic the SRH effect in simulated data. To illustrate another possibility,
consider an individual whose underlying preferences are represented by expected utility
theory. Now imagine that same individual, but with some of their choices perturbed, relative
to their underlying preferences, as a consequence of following a simple heuristic: specifically,
playing it safe when the stakes are high. Evidence consistent with such an effect has been
reported in various studies (e.g., Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005; Lefebvre
et al., 2010; Weber and Chapman, 2005). Here, we show that the operation of this heuristic is
another candidate explanation of the SRH effect.
Following a similar process to that described above, we simulate choices from an EU
model with power utility using choice sets having either positive or zero-skew. We then
estimate preference functions, as before, using the approach we have adopted throughout. The
left hand panel of Figure 9 presents revealed functions based on simulated choices for the
choice sets corresponding with the 1C Experiments and with α=0.5. Notice that in this case, 
where the data generating process is a pure expected utility model, the fit is essentially
perfect, regardless of whether it is estimated from choices simulated on the positive-skew or
the zero-skew data.
Figure 9: Recovered functions for simulated choices: pure EU (left hand panel) and EU plus
play it safe rule (right hand panel).
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The functions presented in the right hand panel of Figure 9 are generated in exactly
the same way except that the simulated choices have been tweaked to incorporate an element
of play it safe when the stakes are high. We do this by adding an increment to the log odds of
safe choices for the small number of choices where the amounts available were both above
100 and only 100 apart: that is, for outcome pairs 200-300, 300-400 and 400-500. By design,
this can only alter choices in the zero-skew condition and it has the effect of creating an SRH
effect via the estimated function based on simulated choices for the zero-skew choice set
becoming more linear.
Notice that the functions revealed for the tweaked data – i.e. with approximately
linear function for the zero-skew treatment and markedly concave function for the positive-
skew treatment – mimic closely the qualitative pattern revealed in the non-flagged Level 3
replication of Experiment 1C (i.e., Experiment L3.c shown in bottom left panel of Figure 5).
In line with the inference we drew from the simulation exercise appending the
expected utility model with heteroskedastic error, we do not wish to argue for the claim that
expected utility preferences combined with a play-it-safe heuristic constitute a good general
account of our data and, in particular, the emergence of the SRH effect.11 Our claim is more
modest. We take these simulation exercises as an indication that the SRH effect may well be a
consequence of model mis-specification. We have shown that if agents are approximately
expected utility maximisers, but their choices depart from expected utility either as a
consequence of a heteroskedastic error, or as a consequence of following a play-it-safe
heuristic then, in either case, the SRH effect can be expected to emerge in functions estimated
via the procedures used by SRH which take no account of these deviations from the
preference model.
While we believe this analysis renders the SRH effect much less mysterious, we
cannot, and do not, rule out other forms of mis-specification as contributory causes of the
observed SRH effect (see Bhatia and Loomes, 2017, for further related discussion).
IV. Conclusion
We showed that the qualitative effects of attribute distributions on utility and
probability weighting functions reported by Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) – which we
have labelled the SRH effect - are highly replicable. We confirmed the analysis reported in
Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) by reanalysing their original data using a slightly refined
11 Using real choice data, Stewart et al. (2017) show that the residuals due to the playing-it-safe-when-the-stakes-
are-high are alone sufficient to create the SRH effect. They explore the broader implications of this for the non-
generalisation of utility functions estimated in different choice sets.
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approach. We then replicated the SRH effect across a set of fresh experiments using designs
approximating their original setup.
Notwithstanding our ability to replicate the SRH effect as just described, however,
results reported above based on new experiments, model-free analysis of choice data and
simulation analysis of synthetic data, together, cast the SRH effect in an entirely new light. A
key result is that we continued to find the SRH effect in new experiments designed such that
the Decision by Sampling model no longer predicts it. We also failed to find any evidence of
effects predicted by Decision by Sampling in model-free analysis of the experimental choice
data. Given these results, we explored alternative explanations for it. Using parameter
recovery simulations, we were able to identify two candidate explanations for the SRH effect.
First, we showed that misspecification of the stochastic form of EU can systematically bias
the estimated utility and probability weighting functions in line with the SRH effect. Second,
we showed that the SRH effect arises when a stochastic EU model is fitted to simulated data
that has been tweaked to incorporate a simple decision heuristic (playing safe when stakes are
high). Both mechanisms are plausible candidates for explaining the phenomenon reported by
SRH.
While we do not interpret the SRH effect as evidence for Decision by Sampling, our
analysis does not imply that the apparent instability of preference functions identified by the
original SRH paper should be dismissed as irrelevant from the point of view of those seeking
to model risk preferences, or to elicit them from choice behaviour. SRH interpreted their
evidence as showing that the shape of the utility functions and weighting functions estimated
from choice data are not just a property of the decision maker, but they are fundamentally
context dependent and vary with features of the choice environment. While our analysis
challenges the idea that the SRH effect is evidence of any irreducible context sensitivity, we
accept that it is nevertheless evidence of a genuine issue, albeit a more familiar or traditional
one to do with model specification. To the extent that our mis-specification interpretation of
the SRH effect is correct, in principle, the SRH effect can be avoided by fitting the “right
model” and thereby eliminating context dependence. In practice, however, the right model
may be an elusive creature and hence problems of mis-specification and associated context
dependency may often be difficult to avoid.
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Appendix A
The calculation errors in SRH’s original analysis that were discovered as a result of
our Level 1 replication analysis are as follows: In Experiment SRH 1A the original analysis
takes into account only 120 instead of 150 questions. However, except from moving the
functions slightly, this has no effect on the difference between the two conditions. In the
description of the analysis of Experiment SRH 2B it is mentioned that none of the participants
violated dominance in more than 10% of the trials. Our analysis shows that 4 participants
violated dominance and therefore should have been excluded from further analysis. Again,
the differences between conditions reported by SRH remain significant after this adjustment.
As we explain in the main paper, the Level 1 analysis we apply and report in the
manuscript differs from SRH’s original analysis in terms of the estimation of both the
confidence intervals (i.e., we used a more reliable bootstrapping method) and the revealed
functions (i.e., we estimated the revealed functions separately for each condition). To further
probe the robustness of the inference from SRH’s as well as our own (Level 1) analysis, it is
useful to test statistically whether SRH conclusions would still hold when correcting the
above calculation errors. Hence, we applied SRH’s original analysis (without the refinements
we use in the analysis reported in the main paper) to SRH raw data and compared the results
with and without taking into account these errors. The results from this comparison are
reported in Table A1 below. Even though there are some minor differences in the reported
statistics with regard to Experiments SRH 1A and SRH 2B, the results are qualitatively very
similar and none of SRH’s original claims are affected by correction of these minor errors.
Table A1. Results from the SRH’s original analysis using SRH raw data with and without the calculation
errors.
With the calculation errors Without the calculation errors
Experiment
Differences in
concavity in the
revealed functions
Differences in weighting
common amounts or
probabilities
Differences in
concavity in the
revealed functions
Differences in weighting
common amounts or
probabilities
SRH 1A χ2(1)=6.36, p=0.012 χ
2(1)=7.05, p=0.0079
between £200 and £310 χ
2(1)= 11.93, p=.0006 χ
2(1)=22.75, p<0.0001
between £200 and £310
SRH 1B χ2(1)=6.99, p=.0082
χ2(1)=26.96, p<0.0001
for the common £100,
χ2(1)=7.16, p=0.0074 for
the common £200
χ2(1)=6.98, p=.0082
χ2(1)=27.20, p<0.0001
for the common £100,
χ2(1)=6.77, p=.009 for
the common £200
SRH 1C χ2(1)=3.50, p=0.06
χ2(1)=59.79, p<0.0001
for the common £100,
χ2(1)=50.47, p<0.0001
for the common £200
χ2(1)=3.49, p=.06
χ2(1)=59.75, p<0.0001
for the common £100,
χ2(1)=50.32, p<0.0001
for the common £200
SRH 2A χ2(1)=2.18, p=0.13
χ2(1)=18.18, p<0.0001
for the common 30%,
χ2(1)=14.31, p=0.0002
for the common 70%
χ2(1)=2.18, p=0.14
χ2(1)=18.22, p<0.0001
for the common 30%,
χ2(1)=14.41, p=0.0001
for the common 70%
SRH 2B χ
2(1)=181.5,
p<0.0001
χ2(1)=41.72, p<0.0001
for the common 50% χ
2(1)=119.6, p<0.0001 χ
2(1)=22.8, p<0.0001 for
the common 50%
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Appendix B
In our Level 3 replication in order to account for the within-subject nature of this series
of experiments, we used only one model including all random effects, instead of using separate
models for each condition as we did for the between-subject experiments.
Figure B1 shows the functional forms and the relative confidence intervals obtained by
estimating a separate model for each condition. By comparing Figure B1 to Figure 5 in the
manuscript, it is possible to see that both the estimated functional forms and the confidence
intervals are very similar across the two figures.
Figure B1: Revealed functions from the replications of SRH in Level 3 using 2 models instead
of 1.
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
